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issues should be based upon the nature of the issues and the particular
situation before the court, keeping in mind what the result would have
been historically and to the policy that favors the protection of the jury
trial right.3 ' When a plaintiff has prayed alternatively for legal or
equitable relief he should have the obligation to state his preference when a
jury trial is demanded. If he prefers the legal remedy the jury should be
called at the start of the trial, and the case will proceed on the legal issues.
If the legal theory fails on a legal ground then the court may dismiss the
jury and decide the equitable question.3 2
When cases arise in which the plaintiff is seeking legal and equitable
relief there are two choices: (1) The court may hear the equitable issues
along with consideration of the legal issues by the jury. After which the
court may enter the proper judgment on the various findings.33 (2) If the
court does not wish to try the questions concurrently it might follow the
procedure used by some of the federal decisions mentioned, including the
Ford case. The trial of the equitable issues, whether raised by the plaintiff
or the defendant on an equitable defense, may be tried entirely apart from
the trial of the jury issues.
Thus, under such practice, the historical right to jury trial will be
preserved without prejudice to any of the parties to the litigation.
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APPEALS FROM A PLEA OF GUILTY IN JUSTICE COURT
At common law there was no right of appeal from a plea of guilty
in any court. Blackstone said that the kind of penalty, if not the degree,
was ascertained for every offense, and neither a judge nor a jury could alter
that penalty.' Since all persons were presumed to know the law and the
sanctions for violating the law, a man who admitted the facts as charged,
by pleading guilty, was not aggrieved and could not appeal. On the other
hand, if a party had pleaded not guilty and was aggrieved by some irregularities in the trial or judgment, he could sue out a writ of error based on
"notorious mistake." 2
In the United States the federal
some extent. While appeals from
general rule in federal courts is that
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collaterial questions which have been considered on appeal from a guilty
plea are procedural irregularity,4 failure of the indictment to state a crime
against the United States,5 and the constitutionality of the statute under
which the defendant was convicted. 0
Since appeals in the United States are not essential to due process,
7
appeal in the state courts exists merely as a matter of legislative generosity.
The statutes allowing appeals in the state courts govern not only the circumstances under which appeals will be allowed, but also the scope of
review which will be allowed upon appeal. 8 But even where the state
legislatures have adopted statutes which appear to abandon the common law
and allow appeals in all cases, the courts, when called upon to interpret
these statutes, have not been in harmony as to the limit of effect to be given
the legislation.
In some states the common law is closely but liberally followed. In
these jurisdictions, appeals from a justice court where the defendant pleaded
guilty are allowed only for the purpose of reviewing collateral questions. 9
Although the statute may provide that a defendant in a criminal action
may appeal as a matter of right from any judgment against him, in the
absence of collateral questions the courts of these jurisdictions treat the
right to appeal as having been waived by a plea of guilty. By analogy to
the situation in federal courts, these states limit review to cases where
there has been an irregularity in the jurisdiction of the court or in the
legality of the proceedings. 10
In Washington, the controlling statutes allow "every person convicted
before a justice of the peace" the right to appeal,1" and the state constitution provides for "the right to appeal in all cases."' 2 The superior court,
on appeal from justice court, has jurisdiction to try the case de novo.13
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Washington held that these rights were
waived by plea of guilty.' 4 With such a strict interpretation the only
appeals allowed after a plea of guilty in Washington's inferior courts are
those which question the validity of the statute under which the defendant
was convicted, the sufficiency of the complaint to state a crime, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which the plea was made.1 5
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the right to appeal") ,16 the Supreme Court of Delaware held in 1955 that
the ordinary meaning of the word "convicted" was a determination of
Because the defendant in that case
guilt after an assertion of innocence.,
had pleaded guilty, he was held not to have been "convicted" and was
denied the right to appeal. The court limited its review to the conThe word "conviction" is said
stitutionality of the sentence imposed. 1
The popular meaning is
meaning.
a
legal
and
to have both a popular
referred to as denoting a verdict of guilty, while the strict legal meaning
includes a judgment against the defendant on either a plea or a verdict of
guilty. 19 The Delaware court obviously applied the popular meaning.
At least one other court has held that a "conviction" based on a plea
of guilty does not preclude appeal.20 These courts are apparently confining the interpretation to legal meaning.
The courts which have interpreted statutes by using the meaning of
"conviction" as it is regarded in common parlance, have not noted any
authority for prefering the popular to the legal definition. While the
Supreme Court of Colorado, in People v. Brown, 21 indicated that the
meaning to a layman was more appropriate as a basis for laying down a
rule, an examination of legal and non-legal dictionaries 22 indicates similar
confusion in both the lay and the legal definitions. If the narrow, popular
construction of "conviction" is in fact not intended by the legislature, the
opinion in People v. Brown suggests a way for the Colorado legislature to
make its contrary intention clear. The court said that use of the word
"sentence," rather than "conviction," as a prerequisite to appeal would
23
clearly show that appeal could be had even after a plea of guilty.
In 1956 the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in deciding State v. Hungary,24 adopted what would seem to be a rule more closely following the

intent of the legislature. The court held in the Hungary case that a
defendant who pleaded guilty in justice court had a statutory right to appeal
from any judgment thereon in all cases, and to have a trial anew in the
district court.
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It was the statutory right to a trial de novo that led the Wyoming
court to decide that appeal from any judgment in justice court must be an
unqualified right. It has been shown that courts can treat the right to
appeal as waived by a plea of guilty unless the statute shows a clear intent
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that such a plea is not to operate as a waiver. But the right to a trial
de novo is not waived by a plea of guilty in the court appealed from.
A trial de novo is extraordinary in that the district court is to try the
case as though it were originally brought before that court. Jurisdiction
is only in a sense appellate, because the defendant has a new trial on the
merits and the district court has no power to review, affirm or reverse the
judgment of the justice court.3 As Justice Parker said in State v. Hungary,
"it is difficult to visualize how a trial could be anew and as an issue of fact
upon an indictment, if a plea of guilty prevented any trial at all."
It would seem then that those courts which have interpreted their
statutes as not allowing appeals from a plea of guilty in spite of a further
right to a trial de novo, have given the legislation an illogical construc27
tion.
The reason some courts are hesitant to interpret their state statutes in
favor of the right to appeal is partly at least the fear of an excess of minor
traffic cases coming before the higher courts to be reviewed or retried. 28
Also it has been said that there are dangers in allowing defendant to
plead guilty in justice court to test what disposition will be made of his
case, with the knowledge that if the judgment is unsatisfactory he can
later plead not guilty in district court and exercise his statutory right to
a new trial on the merits. 29 Policy, however, should not interfere with
statutory rights3 0 and the Wyoming court in the Hungary case recognized
that it had no right to look for or impose meanings different from those
conveyed by the plain, unambiguous language of the statute.
The Wyoming court in the Hungary case did not hold that the
decision would apply to appeals from a municipal court or police court
as well as from a justice court. However the implication is clear that the
Hungary rule would apply to appeals from these inferior courts too,
because the statutes allowing appeals from municipal or police courts
provide that these appeals shall be in the same manner as appeals from a
JOHN CROW
justice court. 31

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
IN WYOMING
The modern medical patient enjoys the benefit of a vast fund of
medical knowledge and a body of law assuring him, to a considerable
degree, that those to whom he entrusts his health and life are possessed of
that knowledge. These laws regulating the practice of medicine are found
in every state, controlling the medical profession and its competitors.
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